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The idea of Latin American regionalism can be traced back far in its history. In fact, 
regional integration in Latin America is an idea as old as the region’s states themselves, 
and it has retained its status as a persistent feature of the international relations of Latin 
America, starting in the early nineteenth century. The struggle for independence in the 
early nineteenth century was waged under a sense of unity, leading afterwards to 
regional conferences and more or less elaborated plans for unity, either in exclusively 
Latin American formations, or in the context of Pan-Americanism, which included the 
United States. Simon Bolívar, José de San Martín, Andrés Bello, and other founding 
fathers and intellectuals played key roles in the struggle for independence and 
consolidation of the new countries, as well as in the efforts to create a league of 
Republics, with common political, defense and commercial institutions, including a 
supranational parliamentary assembly. Their visions never succeeded, but the idea of 
regional cooperation has survived until now. Integration efforts in Latin America have 
undergone numerous vicissitudes, each of them accompanied by fervent enthusiasm, 
only to backslide eventually with a long list of pledges to deeper integration remaining 
unfulfilled. Real progress in integration has remained elusive.  After the Second World 
War, Latin American attempts at regionalism have been pursued through different 
waves, generally associated with specific economic and political models adopted by 
participating states. They have also tended to diverge across space, gradually giving 
birth to separate blocs and overlapping projects.   
The more recent waves of regionalism in Latin America have been associated, 
respectively, with structuralist, neoliberal and post-liberal economic and political 
experiments in the region.  Structuralist regionalism was inaugurated in the 1950s and 
somehow survived until the 1970s; open regionalism followed in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and was replaced, to a certain extent, during the next decade by post-liberal regionalism. 
However, the limits, if not demise, of post-liberal experiments in the most important 
economies of Latin America pose the question of the future of regionalism.  In this 
changing situation, several questions arise. Will regionalism hold sway in Latin America? 
Will present integration schemes continue in the region? Will new entities arise? Will 
there be a convergence in diversity between integration projects in Latin America? Will 
the new context of global uncertainties lead to a revival of regionalism? 
Regionalism and Globalization 
Regionalism is generally accepted as an overarching concept. According to Nye, it can 
refer to, respectively, “the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis 
of regions; and in the doctrinal sense, the advocacy of such formations.”1 It is the 
expression of a regional consciousness that develops from a sense of identity of 
                                                          
1
 Joseph S. Nye, “Introduction,” in International Regionalism: Readings, ed. Joseph S. Nye (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1968), vii.    
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countries situated in geographical proximity, which induces them to cooperate to 
achieve common goals or to confront political, economic, strategic and other practical 
problems.  
Regionalism has become an important feature of world politics in a multipolar 
international system, as demonstrated by the development of several regional cores in 
Europe, North America, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Southern Africa, the  Maghreb, 
the Gulf nations, etc.  On the one hand, globalization is a major external driver for 
regionalism
2
 and on the other, regionalization is one of the fundamental dimensions of 
global restructuring. Peter Katzenstein, for instance, argues that we are approaching a 
“world of regions.”3 Similarly, Acharya refers to “the emerging regional architecture of 
world politics,”4 and the construction of “regional worlds.”5  
Cantori and Spiegel
6
 identified the following characteristics of a region: geographical 
proximity, common bonds (historical, social, cultural, ethnic and linguistic), a sense of 
identity, and international interactions.  Although Börzel
7
  argues strongly in favor of 
clearly differentiating between regional cooperation and regional integration, one might 
also conceptualize regional integration as a special type or subset – not necessarily the 
most frequent – of regional cooperation or regionalism.8  
Regions are porous entities without well-defined boundaries. The relationship between 
Latin America and the Caribbean provides a good example of the porosity of 
regionalism. In some instances, both groupings are merged and act jointly, as in the 
United Nations, where they form the GRULAC (Group of Latin America and the 
Caribbean). However, when it comes to trade issues, the Caribbean countries form their 
own separate group, invoking the need for differentiated treatment. Adhesion to 
subregional groups can also lead to overlapping membership. Guyana and Suriname, for 
instance, were invited to join the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), despite 
their traditional participation in Caribbean institutions and their scant links with most of 
the  South American countries.  
Most regions feature more than one regional organization. Often, these organizations 
are complementary and perform different functions. Regional organizations can also 
overlap, not only in their membership but also in their mandates.  
                                                          
2
 Tanja A. Börzel, “Theorizing Regionalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, eds. 
Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse (Oxford University Press, 2016), 45. 
3
 Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2005).  
4
 Amitav Acharya, “The Emerging Regional Architecture of World Politics,” World Politics 59, no 
4(2007): 629-652. 
5
 Amitav Acharya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for 
International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no 4 (2014):  647–659. 
6
 Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach, 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 6 & 7. 
7
 Tanja A. Börzel, “Comparative Regionalism: European Integration and beyond,” in Handbook of 
International Relations, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth. A. Simmons 2
nd
 Ed (London: 
Sage, 2013).  
8
 Detlef Nolte, Latin America’s New Regional Architecture: A Cooperative or Segmented Regional 
Governance Complex, EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 2014/89 (Florence: European University 
Institute/Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2014).  
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Interregionalism can be considered as an additional step in the theorizing of 
regionalism.
9
 Another author  highlights interregionalism as a consequence of the policy 
of the European Union (EU) of creating and relating to regions as preferred counterparts 
in the international system.
10
 European-Latin American relations provide an example of 
that policy, as well as of its limitations and problems, especially when there is an 
asymmetry between a highly regionalized partner, such as the EU, and a diverse and 
less structured counterpart, as is the case of Latin America in any of the regional 
formations through which it acts.
11
  
One of the last steps in the theorization of regionalism is, somewhat paradoxically, 
transregionalism.
12
  The concept refers to relations which have a special density or 
singularity and which transcend regions. Normally, they are built on elements of like-
mindedness, as is the case in trans-Atlantic relations. They can also be built on cultural 
and historical bonds: the Commonwealth, Francophonie, and Ibero-American 
Community are typical examples. This is also a relevant category for Latin America, not 
only in the case of the Ibero-American Community, but also for those countries of the 
region which participate in Pacific Basin groupings like Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC).  
 
The persistence of the regionalist idea and its major trends  
Regional cooperation and integration in Latin America has historically meant two quite 
different things. In the first place, it has meant regional cooperation between the 
countries of Latin America itself. Multiple initiatives have been launched, and many 
organizations and schemes have been developed under this banner. The second form of 
regionalism covers the entire Western Hemisphere, in the form of Inter-Americanism or 
the Inter-American System.
13
 This brand of regionalism concentrated more on the 
political realm, and its development was largely sponsored by the United States through 
a long series of Pan-American conferences, held from 1889 onwards, with the objective 
of promoting hemisphere-wide regionalism through multilateral institutions addressing 
regional cooperation, trade, development, human rights, democracy, security and other 
concerns. After the Second World War, this form of regionalism was given an elaborate, 
formal and institutional structure in the Organization of American States (OAS) and its 
                                                          
9
 Heiner Hänggi, “Interregionalism as a Multifaceted Phenomenon: In Search of a Typology”, in 
Interregionalism and International Relations, eds. Heiner Hänggi, Ralf Roloff, and Jürgen Rüland (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 31-63. 
10
 Björn Hettne, “Interregionalism in World Order: The Diverging EU and US Models,” in European 
Union and New Regionalism. Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era ed. 
Mario Telò (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 107-126.  
11
 Alberto van Klaveren, “Las relaciones políticas europeo-latinoamericanas,” Nueva Sociedad 189 
(2004), 60. See also Wolf Grabendorff, “La asociación estratégica Unión Europea-América Latina: ¿unas 
relaciones birregionales con geometría variable?” Revista del Centro Andino de Estudios Internacionales 
13 (2013): 155-161. 
12
 Andrea Ribeiro Hoffman, “Inter- and Transregionalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Regionalism, 600-618. 
13
  See Regionalism and Governance in the Americas, ed. Louise Fawcett and Mónica Serrano (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); G. Pope Atkins, Encyclopedia of the Inter-American System (Westport CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1997); and Governing the Americas: Assessing Multilateral Institutions, eds. Gordon 
Mace, Jean-Philippe Thérien, and Paul Haslam (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007).  
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related bodies. The OAS has served as an important forum for political and legal 
debates and agreements between the countries of the hemisphere, as attested by the 
accreditation of permanent ambassadors to the Organization, something that has not 
occurred on the same scale in the case of purely Latin American political international 
organizations. The OAS has also led to the creation of an Inter-American Commission 
of Human Rights (IACHR), with the objective of investigating human rights violations 
in the region and, subsequently, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which was 
founded to adjudicate cases involving the interpretation of the provisions of the 
American Convention of Human Rights, adopted in 1969, but not in force until 1978. 
Although several Latin American countries have voiced strong criticism against the 
operation of these bodies, there are no equivalent institutions at the purely Latin 
American level. In 2001, the countries of the hemisphere established an institutional 
mechanism for the defense of democracy, in the form of an Inter-American Democratic 
Charter, which has been applied in a rather selective manner, proving largely ineffective 
in some cases. In general, however, hemispheric formal institutions have been able to 
persist, despite sometimes stringent differences among its membership, recurrent 
challenges to its legitimacy, and the suspension of one of its founding members, Cuba, 
for almost five decades.   
Hemispheric regionalism has also occasionally been aimed at economic relations. The 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed by Canada, Mexico and the 
United States at the end of 1992, and which came into force at the beginning of 1994, 
was an expression of hemispheric regionalism,  albeit limited to the three Northern 
countries, which were already linked through a process of previous de facto integration.  
The establishment of NAFTA held important implications for the other countries of 
Latin America. Immediately after its conclusion, several countries expressed their 
interest in negotiating free trade agreements with the United States, which in effect 
materialized in several cases in the ensuing decades. Moreover, at the Summit of the 
Americas, which took place in December 1994 in Miami, the leaders of the hemisphere 
agreed to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by the year 2005 at the 
latest, and to achieve 'concrete' progress in negotiations before the end of the century. 
However, the initiative missed the targeted deadline of 2005, met growing resistance 
from several key players in South America -  as became evident in the fourth Summit of 
the Americas, held in Mar del Plata, Argentina - and was finally abandoned.  In the end, 
instead of an all-encompassing hemispheric free trade area, a hub-and-spoke scheme 
developed in the form of several bilateral FTAs of Latin American countries or 
groupings with the United States. 
It is difficult to find strong defenders of hemispheric regionalism in the public discourse 
of Latin American political leaders and representatives, that is, outside the same Inter-
American instances in which they regularly participate. Rather, Latin American 
countries tend to uphold publicly in the global fora the idea of regionalism in its first 
version, i.e., restricted to only Latin American nations. A recent study confirms the 
persistence of a rhetoric of commitment to regionalism in the annual speeches of Latin 
American leaders to the United Nations General Assembly, despite repeated setbacks 
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and failures.
14
  This political discourse should not come as a surprise, considering that 
Latin America has always acted as a regional group in the United Nations. Also, in 
Latin American domestic audiences, references to regionalism tend to be restricted to 
cooperation and integration between Latin American countries, excluding the United 
States. In fact, in the political discourse of Latin American, regionalism is often seen as 
a means of containing the United States and strengthening the negotiation capabilities of 
the countries with the rest of the world.  
Regionalism in Latin America has clearly been state-led, with lesser involvement of 
market and society actors. Although intra-Latin American investments have increased 
significantly, business has not played a leading role in the establishment and/or 
advocacy of integration institutions. Civil society has also remained rather passive, 
sometimes holding closer links with their European and North American counterparts 
than with their Latin American colleagues. Political parties have tended to follow the 
same pattern. Although some parties originally had a regional orientation, the strongest 
foreign links tend to be with European and North American parties or political 
foundations.  
Latin America forms a regional subsystem within the global system and its component 
states share a sense of regional identity and are perceived as such by external actors.
15
 
Accordingly, regional integration has never been eliminated from the foreign policy 
agenda of Latin America. Regional and sub-regional integration arrangements seem to 
be in permanent revision.   
Multiple types of integration initiatives have been under consideration. At times, 
accords represented important rethinking about economic regionalism; they have also 
taken the shape of a complex picture of overlapping initiatives and memberships. 
Regional cooperation and integration has not only been aimed at the emergence or 
renewal of economic accords such as free trade or common market agreements. Latin 
American countries have also developed new forms of cooperation in areas as diverse as 
the development of physical infrastructure, confidence building measures, technological 
development, energy, prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, and foreign policy 
coordination. In some cases, cooperation in these fields has laid the basis for, or at least 
has contributed to, the rise of more ambitious schemes. For instance, Latin America was 
the first region in the world to adopt a Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 
known as the Tlatelolco Treaty. Whereas Antarctica had earlier been declared a nuclear-
weapon-free zone under the 1961 Antarctic Treaty, Latin America was the first the  
region to put in place such a ban over a vast and populated area. On the other hand, the 
nuclear accords between Argentina and Brazil, which started in the early 1980s, opened 
the way for the full adhesion of both regional powers to the Tlatelolco Treaty, and 
served as mutual confidence building measures which contributed to a profound change 
                                                          
14
 Nicole Jenne and Luis Schenoni, Latin American declaratory regionalism: An analysis of presidential 
discourse (1994-2014), EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2015/53 (Florence: European University Institute, 
2015).  
15
 G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System. 2
nd
 ed. (Boulder: Westview, 
1989).  
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in bilateral relations between Brasilia and Buenos Aires, which in turn facilitated the 
establishment of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) in 1991.   
The recurrence of the regionalist idea explains the multiplicity of Latin American 
regional organizations. That situation is not exceptional, since most world regions 
feature more than one regional organization. Often, these organizations are 
complementary and perform different functions. Some are sub-organizations of other or 
wider-ranging regional organizations. However, in Latin America many regional 
organizations overlap with regard to their mandates and constituent members, and 
typically tend to follow stop-go cycles, usually surviving in weakened versions. The 
final picture in Latin America is that of the proliferation and overlapping of regional 
organizations, initiatives, and memberships. 
 
The first wave: between Structuralism and the European example 
The first modern expressions of regionalism in Latin America emerged after the Second 
World War, postulated and advanced mainly by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA), which later included the newly independent 
Caribbean states. ECLA, which became a very influential economic think tank in the 
region, was heavily influenced by the structuralist tradition of economic development, 
pioneered by the Argentine economist, and first Secretary General of ECLA, Raúl 
Prebisch. It reflected the experience of the region, which during the interwar period had 
already suffered the full impact of the economic depression and which throughout 
history had endured recurrent terms of trade asymmetries. Although economic 
structuralism and dependency theory stem from different traditions and maintained 
important conceptual and analytical differences, they converged in their rejection of free 
trade economists, postulating that underdevelopment results from the structural 
dependency and the integration of the developing world in the world economy. The rich 
or central economies, and especially multinational corporations, were seen as the main 
agents preventing the development of endogenous industries in the South, transferring 
their profits to the North and exploiting cheap labor in the developing world.
16
 Even 
though most of the premises of dependency theory could not be confirmed empirically 
and were later disproved by the experience of economies in Asia, which were able to 
grow and develop despite rhetoric to the contrary, it constituted one of the few 
contributions of the developing world to international political economy. It also 
influenced policies in the field of international economic relations.  From this 
perspective, the rationale of regional cooperation was not to be found in functional 
cooperation or the widening of the markets as they existed, but through the fostering of 
structural transformations and the creation of new productive capacities.
17
  
 
                                                          
16
 André Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York and London: 
Monthly Review Press, 1969); Orlando Caputo and Roberto Pizarro, Dependencia y Subdesarrollo 
(Santiago: Centro de Estudios Socio Económicos, Universidad de Chile, 1971); Dependency Theory. A 
Critical Assessment, ed. Dudley Seers (London: Frances Pinter, 1981).  
17
 Fredrik Söderbaum, “Old, New and Comparative Regionalism”, in Fredrik Söderbaum, “Old, New, and 
Comparative Regionalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, 24.   
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Accordingly, regional economic cooperation and integration were seen as a means for 
economic development and autonomy. In practice, integration in Latin America was 
seen as a way to further the process of import-substitution industrialization in the 
region, providing sufficiently large markets to satisfy economies of scale. Moreover, in 
order to avoid fragmentation and duplication, countries would complement each other's 
industrial production through specialization. Non-reciprocity and preferential treatments 
were to be granted to the lesser developed or smaller countries within each scheme. 
Protective barriers were to be erected or maintained against non-regional competitors, 
giving regional or sub-regional products an advantage. Thus, during this first wave of 
economic regionalism Latin American countries did not adopt models of integration 
involving an across-the-board removal of barriers to intra-regional trade and did not 
favor market-based resource allocation. The result was an imperfectly managed trade 
regime, imperfect because its own rules were frequently overridden. Intra-regional trade 
concessions were limited and selective, so as to maintain protection for existing 
industries. In general, integration in Latin America was conceived of as an instrument of 
collective defense against external adversities.
18
 
The drive for integration led to the establishment of the Latin American Free Trade 
Association (LAFTA) in 1960, the Central American Common Market (CACM) in the 
same year, the Andean Pact in 1969 and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in 
1973. The rationale for these schemes was in all cases the extension of import-
substitution industrialization to larger markets than simply national ones. At the same 
time, these schemes were seen as means of strengthening the countries’ bargaining 
power and autonomy vis-à-vis third parties, normally of the developed world.  
In all cases, the objectives of the pacts in the trade area were not achieved. LAFTA, 
which originally proposed the establishment of a free-trade area and industrial planning 
between the largest economies of the region, moved slowly in the direction of simply 
promoting bilateral partial trade agreements until around 40 percent of intra-Latin 
American trade was eligible for preferential tariffs by the mid-1980s.
19
 LAFTA, which 
in fact never achieved something close to free trade in the region, was revamped in 
1980, adopting the rather misleading title of Latin American Integration Association 
(LAIA), somehow implying that it was advancing to a next and more ambitious stage. 
Although the revamped organization has proven useful in providing a general legal 
framework for generally bilateral trade agreements between its member countries, it has 
remained very far from its stated objective.  
Created at the same time as LAFTA, the CACM was initially a success story. It 
gradually eliminated trade barriers between its member states, actively promoted intra-
regional trade, and provided the impulse for the establishment of several Central 
                                                          
18
 Gert.Rosenthal, "Un informe crítico a 30 años de integración en América Latina,” Nueva Sociedad 113 
(1991): 60-65. See also Guillermo Perry, “América Latina: Integración Regional y Globalización,” 
Pensamiento Iberoamericano 1 (2017): 130-139.  
19
 Jean Grugel, “Latin America and the Remaking of the Americas,” in Regionalism and World Order, 
eds.  Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), 135 
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American institutions. However, this integration process stagnated due to regional 
political crises, including a short war between two member states in the late 60s, the 
Central American conflict of the 1970s and the 1980s, and recurrent political and 
economic crises in several of the involved countries.
20
 CARICOM, which was 
established in 1973 to transform the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) into 
a common market, was not very effective in promoting trade among its members, if 
only because the countries inside the Community continued to export a similar range of 
goods.
21
 However, beyond trade, CARICOM can be seen as a successful version of 
regionalism in Latin America. It has promoted strong cooperation among its members; 
it possesses a secretariat, which exercises leadership, and provides advise; it has 
developed a strong sense of identity between the English-speaking states of the 
Caribbean; it has adopted foreign policy common stances; and it has engaged in 
collective negotiations with external partners like the European Union. No other Latin 
American integration model exhibits a similar record.   
In turn, the Andean Pact, created in 1969 by a group of members of LAIA that 
pretended to move faster towards integration, embraced the European institutional 
model. It established a Commission, a Council, a Parliament, and a Court of Justice, 
attempting to incorporate some form of supranationalism. However, as could be 
expected, several of these institutions resembled their European models only in form, 
and lacked real weight, providing an almost perfect example of what Thomas Risse 
identifies as the emulation of regional institutional design.
22
 The Andean Pact, later 
transformed into the Andean Community, provided for intra-regional trade 
liberalization, with a certain component of managed trade. It also included a sort of 
regional planning for the localization of nascent industries, protecting them from 
external competition, and it established a special common statute for foreign 
investment, which included restricted participation and quotas for foreign investors. In 
the end, Chile, one of the founding members, withdrew from the organization in 1976 as 
a consequence of the adoption of radical neoliberal policies under the Pinochet 
dictatorship. Many years later, Venezuela also left the Community, opting to join 
another subregional scheme, MERCOSUR. Even though Colombia and Peru continue 
as full members of the organization, they are placing more energy and hope in a newer 
integration project, the Pacific Alliance, which they founded together with Chile and 
Mexico in 2011.  
MERCOSUR, the Southern Common Market, represents another experiment in 
subregional integration. It was founded in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay, to promote the “free movement of goods, services and factors of production 
between countries through, inter alia, the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff 
                                                          
20
 See Alfredo Guerra-Borges, “La integración latinoamericana, los primeros años,” in Integración 
Latinoamericana y Caribeña, eds. José Briceño Ruiz, Andrés Rivarola Puntigliano and Ángel M. Casas 
Gragea (México DF: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2012), 197-212. 
21
 Jean Grugel, “Latin America and the Remaking of the Americas,” 136.    
22
 Thomas Risse, “The Diffusion of Regionalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, 
96-99. 
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restrictions on the movement of goods, and any other equivalent measures.”23 
MERCOSUR countries agreed to eliminate customs duties, implement a common 
external tariff on certain imports from outside the bloc, adopt a common trade policy 
toward third countries, and realize the free circulation of its citizens. Its long-term goal 
was to become a common market.
24
 However, in the end it did not follow a traditional 
model and turned out very different from many previous or contemporaneous 
experiences.  Although it originally emerged as an expression of open regionalism, in 
practice it also adopted some elements of the structuralist tradition, including forms of 
managed trade, and maintaining considerable degrees of protectionism vis-à-vis third 
partners.
25
 Although it adopted an elaborate institutional framework, its dispute 
settlement procedures have not always been orthodox, including a preference for 
personal contacts between its highest authorities.
26
 Despite these limitations, 
MERCOSUR remains the most significant trading bloc in Latin America, and has 
achieved higher degrees of intra-regional trade than any other integration scheme. It has 
also achieved political significance, reflecting a profound change in the nature of the 
relations between Argentina and Brazil, the largest countries in South America, which 
until the 1970s were characterized by rivalry and mistrust.  
The second wave: Open Regionalism 
Integration efforts in Latin America in the 1990s contrasted sharply with past 
experiences, reflecting the drastic transformations of the development strategies on 
which they were based. They started to be considered as part of an offensive strategy to 
strengthen the insertion of the region in the world economy. The new approach was 
oriented towards an outward-looking, "extroverted" integration strategy,
27
 based on 
market-based resource allocation which had to stimulate competitiveness. Unlike 
previous experiences, integration was accompanied by unilateral trade liberalization and 
the opening of national economies. Thus, the new integration schemes were based on 
across-the-board and accelerated trade liberalization; reciprocity in the concession of 
preferences; the simultaneous search for special trade relations with third countries; 
institutional flexibility; and collective leadership by the governments involved rather 
than by autonomous technical secretariats.
28
 The movement towards these new forms of 
                                                          
23
 Article 1, Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic 
of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay (MERCOSUR). 
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/TreatyAsun_e.asp. Accessed 25 November 2017.  
24
 Félix Peña, "The MERCOSUR and its Prospects: An Option for Competitive Insertion in the World 
Economy, " In Prospects for the Process of Sub-Regional Integration in Central and South America, ed. 
IRELA. Madrid: IRELA, 1992.  
25
 For an analysis of the evolution of MERCOSUR, see Mercedes Botto, La integración regional en 
América Latina: ¿Quo Vadis? (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 2015), and Juliana Peixoto Batista and Daniela 
Perrotta, “El Mercosur en el nuevo escenario político regional: más allá de la coyuntura,” Revista 
Desafíos, no. 30, I, (2017): 91-134.  
26
 Andrés Malamud, “Presidential Diplomacy and the Institutional Underpinnings of Mercosur. 
An Empirical Examination,” Latin American Research Review, 40, no. 1 (2005): 138-64. 
27
 Ruth Zimmerling, Latin America's Future in World Trade: Regional versus World Market Integration. 
Report on the International Conference held on March 24th and 25th in Francfort/Main in cooperation 
with the City of Francfort/Main. (Frankfurt: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1992), 10.  
28
 Guillermo Ondarts, "La nueva integración," Integración Latinoamericana 175 (1992), 12. 
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regionalism was identified as “open regionalism,” adopting a loosely defined concept 
which was first used in the Asia Pacific area, especially at APEC meetings, and which 
was later adopted in Latin America, including ECLAC.
29
 This new wave led to the 
revitalization of sub-regional integration projects throughout Latin America, and was 
closely linked to policies of structural reform and the opening of the participating 
economies to international trade and investment, promoted by what was known as the 
“Washington Consensus”, advocated by a series of institutions based in Washington and 
actively supported by the United States government. The new impulse expressed itself 
in projects for the creation of free trade zones and common markets within very short 
periods of time, aimed at the free circulation of goods, services, capital and persons, 
and, in a later stage, at the coordination of economic policies. These measures were 
adopted by traditional integration schemes such as the Andean Community and the 
Central American Common Market, and by newer initiatives such as MERCOSUR.  
Regionalism -be it in its Latin American or hemispheric variants – was viewed in the 
1990s as a pre-condition for securing effective competitiveness, improved positions in 
global markets and increased negotiating capacity in the field of international economic 
relations. Development options, which emphasized autarchy and national self-
sufficiency, were discarded in almost all countries. Integration was viewed as a means 
to enhance the competitiveness of Latin American industries and services. Widened 
markets were also considered as more attractive to foreign partners and become 
effective instruments for competing for goods, services and capital in world markets. 
The Central American Common Market (CACM) rapidly followed the new trend, 
facilitated by the end of the Central American conflict and the democratization 
processes which took place in the 1990s. The reduction of political tensions and the 
prospects for economic recovery in the area revived the regional institutions. In 1991, 
the five members of the renewed CACM and Panama established the System of Central 
American Integration (SICA), aimed at the establishment of a common market, the 
strengthening of the sub-regional institutions, and the adoption of a common financial 
and exchange system. There was no doubt that these steps reflected a strong 
commitment to regional cooperation and regional integration, but each country also took 
its own steps to preserve some of its priorities and establish special relations with its 
main foreign partners, especially the United States. This ambivalence was especially 
evident in the case of Costa Rica, which had more diversified and dynamic foreign trade 
than its neighbors. Moreover, important sectors in Costa Rica were fearful of linking 
their economic destiny to the rest of Central America too closely, because of the long 
record of political and economic instability that had affected the other countries. 
Panama's very open economy and its role as intermediary also placed it in a different 
position regarding an eventual common market. Central American exercises in regional 
variable geometry surpass those of any other integration process. Only a few member 
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states participate in the Customs Union, three are part of the so called Northern triangle 
(Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras), six are part of the Central American 
Parliament as full members, and eight are part of SICA.  
A similar ambiguity was present in the case of the Andean Community. Although at the 
onset of the 1990s its then five member countries targeted 1995 for the establishment of 
a free trade area, and 1997 for the implementation of a common market, the deadlines 
were not met. In 1992 Peru decided to suspend its membership in the five-nation pact, a 
decision which was maintained until 1994. On the other hand, several members initiated 
negotiations for their own bi- and trilateral free trade zones. Adding confusion to this 
already blurred sub-regional design, Venezuela left the Andean Community in 2006, 
arguing that it had decided to join MERCOSUR  and declaring that the Community had 
become “mortally wounded” after Colombia and Peru had signed free trade agreements 
with the United States.
30
 On the other hand, Bolivia made clear its interest to join 
MERCOSUR in the face of its strong economic interdependence with Brazil and 
Argentina, but without leaving the Andean Community.   
 
Open regionalism also adopted a hemispheric dimension. The "conversion" of the 
United States to the regional approach
31
 led to the creation of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and to the broader vision of hemispheric partnership 
outlined in the 1994 Summit of the Americas, which led to the proposal of a Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA). Before the 1990s, both notions would not only have 
been dismissed as implausible but would also have been rejected for different reasons in 
the United States and Canada, on one hand, and the Latin American countries, on the 
other. 
NAFTA was not geared towards the establishment of a common market and was not 
intended to emulate any formal integration process. It did not pretend to become a 
customs union with a common external tariff; it did not cede sovereignty to common 
economic or political institutions; it did not contemplate the free movement of labor; it 
did not include common agricultural or social policies; and it did not establish special 
funds to rectify the imbalances between the United States and Canada, on the one hand, 
and what is essentially a developing country such as Mexico, on the other. However, it 
was evident that the three member countries of NAFTA were already linked through a 
process of de facto integration. The density of cross-border interdependence has created 
problems that demanded common management. Thus, the agreement was considered as 
a way to formalize, regulate and deepen an ongoing process.  
Mexico's option for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with its North American neighbors 
represented a radical break from the past. Historically, the idea of integration with the 
United States had been discarded by Mexican political leaders and elites on nationalistic 
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grounds. However, the new economic realities of the country led to a revision of this 
traditional position. In less than a decade, Mexico was transformed from a highly 
protected and state-centered economy into an open one. For its new strategy to succeed, 
access to the main world markets had to be secured. After an initial search for new 
partners, Mexico realized that its heavy reliance on the U.S. market was an inescapable 
reality. In that context, an FTA with the United States was seen as a guarantee for 
continued access to a market which  at the time accounted for more than 70 percent of 
Mexican foreign trade, and as a powerful incentive for the attraction of new U.S. 
investments.
32
 Additionally, it was viewed as a means to provide external reinforcement 
for the policies adopted by past governments and ensure the continuation of those 
policies in the future.   
The establishment of NAFTA held important implications for the other countries of 
Latin America. Immediately after its conclusion, several countries of the region 
expressed their interest in negotiating FTAs with the United States. Their reasons were, 
to a certain extent, similar to those of Mexico. They viewed this option as a guarantee 
for continuous and predictable access to the U.S. market and as an incentive for foreign 
investors, proceeding from either the United States or third countries interested in 
accessing that market. The option seemed more valuable in the context of growing 
perceptions about the inevitable breakup of the world economy into trading blocs and 
the threat of the resurgence of protectionism. At the same time, free trade agreements 
with the United States were seen as a kind of insurance against the reversal of open and 
market-oriented economic policies as well as authoritarian setbacks.  
In this favorable context, all the countries of the Western Hemisphere, except Cuba, 
embarked on the negotiation of the FTAA, which was supposed to extend NAFTA to all 
of the Americas. The proposal for the FTAA had its roots in the Enterprise for the 
Americas Initiative, announced by U.S. President George H.W. Bush in 1990. 
Following the signing of NAFTA in 1992, the earlier proposal was renewed under the 
aegis of the President Bill Clinton administration at the 1994 Summit of the Americas in 
Miami. The FTAA negotiations were carried out under an agreed structure and 
timetable. The final phase of the negotiations was placed under the co-chairmanship of 
Brazil and the United States in 2002, with a view to concluding all negotiations by 
January 1, 2005, and implementing the agreement no later than December 2005. As 
many as ten cities in the Americas presented their candidacies to host the FTAA 
secretariat. However, the initiative met the growing opposition of a group of countries 
led by Venezuela, already under President Chávez, and was finally rejected when 
Argentina and Brazil joined the group of objectors. What survived was a hub-and-spoke 
network of bilateral FTAs between Latin American countries and the United States, 
which was inaugurated by Chile (2003), and followed by Peru (2009), Colombia (2012), 
the Central American countries, and the Dominican Republic (2006-2009). On the other 
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hand, 17 smaller Caribbean countries were granted preferential access to the U.S. 
market through the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, adopted by the United 
States in 2000. The major exception to this trend is represented by the MERCOSUR 
countries, which discarded the option of a free trade agreement with the U.S., although 
all of them participated, with variable degrees of enthusiasm, in the FTAA. In contrast, 
MERCOSUR has been negotiating an Association Agreement which includes a free 
trade pillar with the European Union since 2000, but after 17 years negotiations are still 
ongoing.  
The third wave: Post-Liberal Regionalism 
Domestic political changes in several Latin American countries and the rejection of 
neoliberal policies as framed by the Washington consensus led to the adoption of what 
several authors identified as post-liberal regionalism.
33
 Its proponents saw this new form 
of regionalism as post-hegemonic, meaning the partial displacement of dominant forms 
of U.S.-led neoliberal governance.
34
 This wave gave rise to new initiatives, including 
the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our Americas (ALBA), the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States (CELAC). What these initiatives had in common was their aim to prioritize 
political cooperation among like-minded Governments, to bolster the bargaining power 
of Latin America vis-à-vis its main external partners, and to speak with a common voice 
in the global arena. Trade, which had played an important role in traditional regionalism 
in Latin America, was relegated to a secondary role, if not directly eliminated from the 
new schemes. In addition, the new wave of regionalism not only excluded the United 
States and Canada, but was also presented as an alternative to hemispheric regionalism. 
The impact of post-liberal regionalism was also felt in some of the traditional 
integration schemes, especially MERCOSUR. 
The most radical expression of post-liberal regionalism was ALBA, initially proposed 
by President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela in 2001, but which only materialized in 2004 
when Presidents Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez endorsed the first declaration of the 
new grouping. ALBA represented a radical, ideologically transformative project that 
attempted to extend Chávez’s twenty-first century socialism into the pursuit of a 
regional integration scheme, in direct opposition to neoliberalism. Since its conception 
in 2004, it proposed an alternative model of development underpinned by new 
principles of solidarity and complementarities. It is based on two pillars: endogenous 
development and a new internationalism based on the rejection of capitalism and 
imperialism and the practice of multinational companies. Part of its attraction to the 
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smaller economies derived not so much from its ideological overtones but from 
Venezuela’s Petrocaribe program, which has given Caribbean states oil supplies under a 
flexible credit mechanism, allowing them to pay for each shipment partly through cash, 
financing at low interest rates, or through the purchase of goods. On the other hand, 
Cuba’s relatively well-prepared professional resources provided another source of 
exchange within the grouping. Accordingly, Cuban doctors, teachers, sports trainers and 
military advisors are present in most of the other ALBA countries.  
The creation of UNASUR was a more complex story. It was the result of a series of 
presidential summits initiated by Brazil in the year 2000, which responded to a new 
geopolitical concept developed by its diplomacy and policy advisors.
35
 If  historically 
Latin American regionalism had encompassed all of the region, including South 
America, Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean, gradually some analysts and 
practitioners developed the idea of a separation between the Northern part of Latin 
America, inevitably linked to the United States, and South America, which could aspire 
to greater autonomy and a more diversified global role. Accordingly, UNASUR, 
conceded a sort of “symbolic gravitas to South America as a viable geopolitical 
entity.”36 For some time, Latin America seemed to have been replaced by South 
America. If, traditionally, inter-regional presidential summits were held between all 
Latin American countries and for instance, the European Union or the United States and 
Canada, in the 2000s new inter-regional summits were held between only South 
America and, Africa or the Arab world.   
Although the idea of a South American community initially reflected Brazil’s own core 
interests and goals, its final structure was the result of a complex and long negotiation in 
which several other countries of the region left their footprint. On the one hand, 
Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador attempted to introduce some form of supranationalism 
as well as ALBA’s principles and concepts in the new organization. On the other, Chile, 
Colombia, and Peru, sometimes aided by Argentine and Brazilian diplomats, tempered 
the enthusiasm of the proponents of supranationalism and enhanced traditional regional 
political cooperation within the new organization.
37
 In the end, UNASUR was 
established in 2008 and is in force since 2011. Its objective, as stated in Article 2 of its 
Constitutive Treaty, is “to set up, in a participatory, agreed manner, a space for 
integration and union among its peoples in the cultural, social, economic and political 
fields, prioritizing political dialogue, social policies, education, energy, infrastructure, 
financing and the environment, among others, with a view to eliminating socioeconomic 
inequality, in order to achieve social inclusion and citizen participation, strengthen 
democracy and reduce asymmetries within the framework of bolstering the sovereignty 
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and independence of the States.”38 The omission of trade liberalization from the main 
objectives of UNASUR is not accidental, since UNASUR did not include a trade 
agenda.  
As a new organization, UNASUR reinforced the overlapping of regional organizations 
in Latin America. Its entrance into a regional architecture already packed with 
institutions – such as OAS, MERCOSUR, the Andean Community, the Rio Group, or 
ALADI – generated doubts and some friction both between and within them. From the 
beginning UNASUR adopted a political profile. One of its first successes was mediation 
in an internal crisis in Bolivia in 2008. It also mediated to quell a police insurrection in 
Ecuador in 2010, and contributed to allay bilateral tensions between Colombia and 
Venezuela in the same year. It also established sectorial committees on a wide group of 
issues, ranging from the promotion of physical integration through transport, energy and 
communication networks, to public health, social and economic affairs and defense. The 
establishment of the South American Defense Council of UNASUR in 2008 was 
probably the most controversial among them, since it was seen by some of its 
proponents as a substitute for the old Inter-American Defense Board, traditionally 
dominated by the United States.  In practice, its achievements have been rather modest, 
including some useful confidence-building measures, but staying far from its more 
ambitious goal of becoming a kind of South American collective security organ.  
At the time of its creation, UNASUR was the product of a coalition of governments 
with ideological affinities. However, it has not been able to maintain the organization’s 
momentum. New political leaders have refrained from visiting its dazzling headquarters, 
inaugurated with fanfare in 2014 next to the Middle of the World monument outside of 
Quito, Ecuador; presidential summits have been postponed; and member states have 
been unable to elect a new Secretary General to succeed former President Samper of 
Colombia, who despite his previous moderate political background became a promotor 
of the interests of radical ALBA countries within the organization.   
The establishment of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) 
in 2011has also been identified with post-liberal regionalism, although it can be seen as 
the culmination of a series of initiatives of political regional cooperation initiated with 
the Contadora Group, launched in the early 1980s by Colombia, Mexico, Panama and 
Venezuela to deal with the Central American crisis, and which was continued and 
expanded by the Rio Group, created in 1986 to support democracy and political 
cooperation in the region.
39
 Its geographic scope is wider than UNASUR as it includes 
all Latin American and Caribbean countries. It has no permanent secretariat, functioning 
pro tempore, rotating presidencies amongst its member states.  Its main goal was to 
assemble, for the first time, all 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries, which had 
not jointly met in other mechanisms without the presence of countries from outside the 
region. Its other objectives are cooperation for development and political dialogue. It 
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has promoted ministerial or high-level meetings on different issues relevant to the 
region, such as education, social development, culture, transportation, infrastructure and 
energy. As was the case of UNASUR, trade liberalization was left out of its agenda. In 
terms of political consultations, CELAC has issued statements on relevant matters of the 
international and regional agenda, and has served as a regional interlocutor for 
dialogues between Latin America with the rest of the world, maintaining mechanisms of 
political dialogue and cooperation and the European Union, China, Russia and India. 
CELAC assumed the regional interlocution role in the dialogue and cooperation 
mechanism between Latin America and the Caribbean and the European Union (EU), 
established in 1999. Although originally devoid from the more ideological overtones of 
UNASUR, CELAC is following a similar fate. It has been unable to cope with the last 
political crises in the region, and in 2017 it had to suspend its bi-annual summit with the 
EU due to internal irreconcilable differences among its members concerning the 
Venezuelan crisis.   
MERCOSUR also embraced the momentum of post-liberal regionalism in Latin 
America.  Although it never formally abjured from its initial trade liberalization 
orientation, which included universal, automatic, and linear removal of trade barriers, 
and the establishment of a free-trade area with elements of an incomplete customs 
union,
40
 during the Kirchner governments it tended to concentrate more on public policy 
packages and political issues. The political relaunching of MERCOSUR could 
compensate for its exhaustion in economic terms. Even though Brazil and Argentina, its 
major members, held similar views on the domestic model of economic development, 
this concurrence was not helpful for the recovery of the project. The agenda of 
‘productive integration’ in Argentina, which was shared by Brazil, was often interpreted 
in Buenos Aires as legitimizing protective measures against Brazilian exports, ignoring 
MERCOSUR’s trade rules.41  
No issue reflected better the politicization of MERCOSUR during the post-liberal wave 
than the admission of Venezuela and the suspension of Paraguay. Venezuela applied for 
admission to MERCOSUR in 2006, without complying with the admittedly modest 
acquis communautaire of the entity. Although the Executives of the four founding 
members -Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay- supported the admission, the 
incorporation was blocked by the then opposition dominated Senate of Paraguay. After 
six years’ standoff, Venezuelan membership was finally approved, as the suspension of 
Paraguay, whose President had been impeached and deposed, removed the remaining 
legal obstacle. However, in 2017, political changes in Argentina and Brazil, and the 
readmission of Paraguay as a full member of MERCOSUR, now led to the suspension 
of Venezuela from the organization on the grounds that its democratic order had been 
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ruptured.
42
 In any case, for an economy as uncompetitive as that of Venezuela, the 
rationale for belonging to the bloc was not related to trade or other economic interests 
but to the international legitimization of its revolutionary regime and to stave off 
perceived threats from the US.
43
 Although officially it is still negotiating its accession, 
Bolivia is a full member of MERCOSUR, yet it remains  
a full member of the Andean Community and ALBA.   
 
The fourth wave: coping with diversity 
Post-liberal regionalism was not the only game in town in Latin America. In 2011, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru established the Pacific Alliance, which was 
formalized by a Framework Agreement signed in Cerro Paranal, Chile, one year later.  
Its aims are to promote the “deep integration” of economies through the free movement 
of goods, services, capital and labor, and to strengthen ties with the world, and the Asia-
Pacific region in particular. The four members have moved swiftly. In 2013, they signed 
an agreement to abolish tariffs on 92% of merchandise trade, with the remainder to be 
eliminated by 2020. They have scrapped tourist visa requirements for each other’s 
citizens, and have opened some shared embassies and trade promotion offices abroad. 
The project has also attracted considerable international interest, as demonstrated by the 
more than fifty countries, which have adopted observer status. Four of them –Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and Singapore- have been invited to become Associated States, 
which implies negotiating a collective last generation free trade agreement with the 
Pacific Alliance.  
The Pacific Alliance is not only geared towards deepening trade and market access, but 
is also committed to going a step further in areas as government procurement, 
innovation, foreign trade, “single-window”, movement of people, and trade facilitation, 
among other areas. Three of the founding members participate in APEC and are 
currently part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative. As Leví Coral and 
Reggiardo
44
 recall, the Pacific Alliance is a form of open regionalism that clearly differs 
from post-hegemonic/post-liberal regionalism. In fact, it can be seen as an effort of four 
like-minded countries to promote an alternative to post-liberal regionalism, and bringing 
back Mexico to the region, and especially to South America. In contrast to the 
reluctance of MERCOSUR to secure free trade agreements with its most relevant 
foreign partners, the four members of the Pacific Alliance have opted for a pragmatic 
relationship structured around bilateral PTAs with the US, the EU, and Asian countries. 
Despite the commonly held view that the Pacific Alliance is a counterweight to 
UNASUR or MERCOSUR, it has put the economy first and has been extremely careful 
to avoid any political statements.  
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However, the Alliance also faces obstacles. Its members are separated by vast distances 
and poor communication and have relatively few economic links. Intra-group trade is 
modest, and slightly sinking.  Even MERCOSUR’s intra-block trade is more significant 
as a share of the group’s total than that of the Alliance. The integration of its financial 
markets and stock exchange through the establishment of the Integrated Latin American 
Market (MILA) proved more difficult than was initially envisaged.  
It is tempting to depict a scenario of confrontation and rivalry between the Pacific 
Alliance, seen as a comeback of open regionalism, and MERCOSUR, seen a sort of 
incarnation of post-liberal regionalism. For a while, the idea of an Atlantic-Pacific 
divide seemed a reality in Latin America.
45
 In terms of trade policies, there were 
grounds to sustain it, but in political and geopolitical terms, it was never a reality. Chile 
has maintained closer relations with Argentina, even under governments of diverging 
ideological orientations, than with any of its Pacific Alliance partners. Santiago was also 
unwilling to alter its traditional relations with Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Peru 
significantly strengthened its political and economic ties with Brazil at the time that it 
cofounded the Pacific Alliance. Although Mexico was excluded from several regional 
initiatives and resented Brazilian policies, especially under the Lula governments,
46
 both 
countries always found some means of accommodation, as demonstrated by their 
participation in the establishment of CELAC.  
Furthermore, political changes in the region point to a more nuanced picture. 
MERCOSUR countries are implementing economic reforms, including privatizations, 
and measures to liberalize some sectors of its industry and to attract foreign investment, 
which bring them closer to the policies adopted by the Pacific Alliance. Argentina and 
Uruguay have already negotiated their own bilateral trade agreements with Chile in 
2017, abandoning the idea of only holding negotiations with third countries together 
with their MERCOSUR partners.  This does not mean that trade policies in Latin 
America will automatically converge, but at least there is a certain rapprochement 
between the most relevant subregional groupings.  
It is against this background that in 2014 the government of Chile proposed the idea to 
hold an informative Ministerial Dialogue between members of the Pacific Alliance and 
MERCOSUR, as well as the hosting of a seminar of academics, businessmen, 
entrepreneurs and senior officials of the Pacific Alliance, MERCOSUR and other 
countries of the region, including Central America and the Caribbean. In the same spirit, 
ECLAC prepared a background report on the subject.
47
 The report demonstrated the 
density of the network of agreements and existing relations between the countries from 
the Alliance and MERCOSUR. It is a network that has intensified in recent decades, 
especially in some of its connections, such as those in bilateral trade between Chile, 
Peru and Colombia, on the one hand, and Brazil and Argentina, on the other. For 
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example, the partial agreements signed between these countries, within the framework 
of the LAIA, and the relations between MERCOSUR and the Andean Community of 
Nations, have already produced a complete tariff reduction between Chile and 
MERCOSUR countries (100%). The percentages are also high in the cases of Peru 
(88%) and Colombia (90%). Another relevant fact was that in 2013 intra-MERCOSUR 
trade represented 14% of the global trade of its member countries, while intra-Alliance 
trade represented only 3.5%. In the first case, the percentages were more significant 
because they included trade in manufactured goods. In turn, exports of the Alliance 
countries to MERCOSUR were higher than intra-Alliance exports (in 2013, intra-
Alliance exports were US$19,500 million whereas those destined to MERCOSUR 
totaled US$23,700 million). Chile, Colombia and Mexico exported more to 
MERCOSUR than to the Alliance countries. Additionally, data on trade in services and 
investments -even if incomplete- reveals the intensity of the relations between the 
Pacific Alliance and MERCOSUR countries, especially with Argentina and Brazil. This 
data, together with the new political scenario in the region, reveals potential for a 
convergence between the two main integration schemes in Latin America. However, as 
was stated by Minister Heraldo Muñoz at the inauguration of the Ministerial Dialogue, 
convergence does not imply unifying the two integration schemes nor engaging in tariff 
negotiations. It does imply, however, recognizing and respecting the differences 
between the objectives and the methods of both schemes, and even between the trade 
and development strategies and policies of its member countries.
48
 Various issues have 
been identified as deserving priority action. The main ones were: physical connectivity; 
trade facilitation; value chains and SME participation in them; student exchanges, 
including reciprocal internships between companies; the development of tourism; 
diagnostic capabilities on global economic competition; innovation and scientific and 
technological development; and monitoring and participation in international trade 
negotiations, both at the global multilateral level and at the interregional level. As a 
qualified observer of the process remarked, “Perhaps the main challenge that was posed 
as a result of the Santiago de Chile Seminar is to devise and recognize the need to 
develop short agendas and road maps for the priority areas of future joint action 
between the members of the different integration schemes. It is a challenge that involves 
not only governments, but also business, labor and academic institutions.
49
 And, it may 
be added, the challenge is still present. 
 
Conclusions 
Economic integration theory tends to present the integration process as the passage from 
less intense or demanding forms of inter-governmental cooperation to the actual union 
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of economies. The path towards economic union includes subsequent stages such as a 
free-trade area, a customs union, a common market, an economic community, and an 
economic and political Union.
50
 This rather linear approach is not applicable to Latin 
America. In fact, integration in Latin American presents a complex and disorderly 
pattern. The removal of barriers can be partial and incomplete. A customs union 
announced in a treaty or a formal declaration can turn out in something very different in 
reality. The adoption of successive integration instruments can be more nominal than 
real. Some partial agreements have proven to be more effective for the removal of 
barriers and the strengthening of mutual interdependence than elaborate common 
market structures. A free trade arrangement, to the extent that it includes across-the-
board tariff reduction, can be more far-reaching than a process aimed at the formation of 
a common market. Informal integration, consisting of intense patterns of interaction 
which develop without the impetus of deliberate political decisions, is often more 
important than formal integration. If there is a Latin American equivalent of the East 
Asian manufacturing supply chain, it lies not within any of the Latin American 
integration schemes but in Mexico’s de facto integration with the United States. It is not 
very realistic to see integration in the region as a progression along the continuum that 
extends from cooperation to full integration. Accordingly, integration alternatives in the 
region are not pursued in a deliberate sequence and do not necessarily represent steps 
that follow a logical order.  The signing of an integration treaty does not establish 
integration.  As an author recalls, “It only signifies a promise by the leaders of several 
states to engage in a particular course of action over a period of time towards the aim of 
tying the economies of their countries closer together. True integration is achieved 
through the implementation of this promise, which entails a lengthy process of 
establishing common rules, regulations, and policies. It is these rules, regulations, and 
policies, based either on specific treaty provisions or derived over time from the general 
principles and objectives written into integration treaties, which will translate the 
aspiration for regional prosperity into reality.”51  
 
Börzel argues that an integration process “involves the setting up of supranational 
institutions to which political authority is delegated to make collective binding 
decisions.”52 If we apply this definition, there would be no example of a successful 
scheme in Latin America. However, if integration is synonymous with regionalism or 
regionalization,
53
 the picture that emerges is more nuanced. Despite all of its 
shortcomings, Latin America exhibits considerable degrees of “interaction between 
political units (subnational, national, or transnational) provided by actors sharing 
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common ideas, setting objectives and defining methods to achieve them, and by so 
doing contributing to building a region.”54 Obviously, the concrete results of these 
interactions are less than satisfactory in the areas of economics and politics, but the 
intentions remain. Some authors have attempted to deal with this phenomenon through 
the concepts of cooperative or segmented regional governance.
55
 Present reality in Latin 
America seems closer to segmented regionalism. It is still not clear how the regional 
architecture will evolve and what the emergence of a multifaceted pattern of 
overlapping regional organizations and projects will imply. What seems clear is that in 
the future there will be new initiatives and new efforts to revamp existing schemes. The 
myth of Sisyphus comes to mind.  
However, the institutional disorder of Latin American regionalism should not be 
confused with the absence of regional regimes in the area. In fact, Latin America shares 
common values and norms regarding peace and security, such as the peaceful settlement 
of disputes, nonintervention, and the prohibition of arms of mass destruction, which are 
comparable to other regions of the world. Additionally, it has adopted common norms 
for the protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Although the latter 
have not always been respected in all of the countries, they still stand as the most 
elaborate regional regime in the developing world. Some of the regional regimes have 
emerged from existing regional institutions, as was the case of the human rights regime, 
developed within the Inter-American framework. Others have evolved from strong 
historical and legal traditions, as was the case of the peaceful settlement of disputes. 
Others were the result of ad hoc negotiations, as was the case in the prohibition of 
nuclear weapons through the Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967.  
In sum, despite all of the confusion and limitations of Latin American regionalism, there 
is still a considerable degree of “regionness”, which has led to a Latin American 
international society ruled by common norms and shared practices. The fact that no 
institution in the region has been capable of regulating and governing this regionness 
adds another complexity to the study of Latin American regionalism.  
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